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Abstract
The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric.
For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about
their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts
cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is:
is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does
it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by com-
paring them to analogous questions that have been investigated for
scientic explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been
proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unication, and (iii) ex-
planatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the
former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphys-
ical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence cri-
terion (in modied format) holds of them.
1. Introduction
Consider the following explanatory claims:
(#) The agpole’s shadow is 10m, because the agpole is 10m (and the
sun’s angle of elevation is 45◦).
(1) The agpole resembles all other 10m objects, because it is 10m.
(2) The agpole is 10m, because its parts are jointly 10m.
(3) The agpole is disposed to be visible from a great distance, because
it has a great height.
(4) The agpole is beautiful, because it has a symmetrically shaped
shadow (or plug in your favourite aesthetic theory).
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(5) The proposition that the agpole is 10m is true, because the fact that
the agpole is 10m exists.
(6) The singleton {agpole} exists, because the agpole does.
(7) We think about the agpole’s shadow, because our brain parts such
and such are active.
(8) The agpole has the property ‘being such that all of us think of its
shadow’, because all of us think of its shadow.
(#) is an ordinary claim, whereas (1)(8) are less ordinary. The latter are
metaphysical explanatory claims, or at least candidates thereof, where re-
spectively resemblance facts are explained by facts about their relata (e.g.
Armstrong 1978: 501); facts about wholes by facts about their parts (e.g.
Kim 1994: 67); dispositional facts by categorical facts (e.g. Ruben 1990:
22530); evaluative facts by non-evaluative facts (e.g. Kim 1990); the truth
of propositions by their truthmakers (e.g. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005); facts
about classes by facts about their members (e.g. Correia 2005); mental facts
by neurophysiological facts (e.g. Kim 1990); and Cambridge facts by non-
Cambridge facts (Kim 1974).
In this paper we shall not deal, in general, with the important issue what
might discern (1)(8) from (#). Rather, we will be focussing on only one
aspect of them, i.e. their supposed asymmetry.1 Take notice:
One explains the truth of the proposition that the rose is red in terms
of the rose’s being red, but not vice versa. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005:
21)
It is natural to assert that things resemble each other because they
have something in common, counter-intuitive to say that they have
something in common because they resemble each other. (Arm-
strong 1978: 50)
Often it is thought, and claimed, that a thing has a supervenient
property because, or in virtue of the fact that, it has the correspond-
ing base property, or that its having the relevant base property ex-
plains why it has the supervenient property. All these relations are
essentially asymmetric. (Kim 1990: 16)
1 In the present debate asymmetry is understood locally, i.e. one explanatory claim can
be asymmetric (X explains Y, and not so that Y explains X), even if not all of them are. By
this usage, which we shall follow, there can be explanatory asymmetries in the plural: each
explanatory claim that is asymmetric constitutes an ‘explanatory asymmetry’.
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a is prior to {a} insofar as the existence of a explains, or helps ex-
plain, the existence of {a}  while the converse is false. (Correia
2005: 53)
Asymmetry is the consensus, and to our knowledge nobody ever denied, or
even questioned it. It would follow that all of the following claims are false
(or, if they are true, that (1)(8) are false):
(1∗) The agpole is 10m, because it resembles all other 10m objects.
(2∗) The agpole’s parts are jointly 10m, because the agpole is 10m.
(3∗) The agpole has a great height, because it is disposed to be visible
from a great distance.
(4∗) The agpole has a symmetrically shaped shadow, because it is beau-
tiful.
(5∗) The fact that the agpole is 10m exists, because the proposition that
the agpole is 10m is true.
(6∗) The agpole exists, because the singleton {agpole} does.
(7∗) Our brain parts such and such are active, because we think about the
agpole’s shadow.
(8∗) All of us think of the agpole’s shadow, because the agpole has the
property ‘being such that all of us think of its shadow’.
Hence quite a lot follows from the asymmetry of explanation. In this paper
we address two interrelated questions:
- Is there a good reason for regarding metaphysical explanations as
asymmetric, or is this just a widespread prejudice?
- If there is asymmetry, what is its nature?
We tackle these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that
have been investigated for scientic explanations, and proceed as follows.
In Sect. 2 we briey describe how the asymmetry problem has arisen in the
literature on scientic explanation. In Sect. 3 we discuss the most popular
tool for dealing with the problem, viz. causation. In Sects 45 we discuss
two alternative criteria that have been proposed: unication and explanatory
dependence. In Sect. 6 we spell out the metaphysical explanations (1)(8),
and in Sect. 7 we investigate whether the three criteria from Sects 35 can
be applied to those cases. Sect. 8 concludes our investigation.
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2. Nomic expectability
According to Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of scientic explana-
tion (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965), the tuple <L, C1, . . . Ck>
is a potential explanans for sentence E exactly if:
- L is a sentence which describes an universal law;
- C1, . . . Ck are sentences which describe particular conditions;
- E is deductively derivable from the conjunction of L, C1, . . . Ck;
- E is not deductively derivable from C1, . . . Ck alone.
Furthermore, <L, C1, . . . Ck> is a true explanans for E iff it is a potential
explanans for E and all premises (both laws and conditions) are true. Con-
sider the famous agpole example (it seems to originate from a suggestion
of Bromberger to Hempel, see Bromberger 1992: 8):
(F1) L s = h/ tan(a).
C1 The height of the agpole is 10m.
C2 The angle of elevation of the sun is 45◦.
∴ E The shadow of the agpole is 10m.
In this case, the length of the shadow (s) is explained by the geometrical law
coupled with the height of the agpole (h) and the angle of elevation of the
sun (a). E is deductively derivable from the conjunction of L (which is put
as a geometrical law, but may be specied in physical terms, i.e. that light
travels in straight lines), C1 and C2, but not from C1 and C2 alone. And
if both L, and C1 and C2 are true, we have a true explanans for E. This is
basically Hempel’s seminal theory of (deductive) scientic explanation.
As is well-known, among other problems it faces the asymmetry problem.
We just saw that by Hempel’s model the length of the shadow receives an
explanation. But the same can be done for the height of the agpole:
(F2) L h = s · tan(a).
C1 The shadow of the agpole is 10m.
C2 The angle of elevation of the sun is 45◦.
∴ E The height of the agpole is 10m.
So by the geometrical law plus the angle of elevation of the sun, we can both
explain the length of the shadow by the height of the agpole (derivation F1),
and vice versa (derivation F2). This should not surprise us: lling out two
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of the three variables, will give us (and so explain, according to Hempel)
the third, no matter which one it is. This is a very counterintuitive result
however: intuitively, almost everyone agrees that the length of the shadow
can be explained by the agpole’s height, but its height cannot be explained
by the length of its shadow.
Interestingly, Hempel’s own response to the problem is that our intuitions
are mistaken, and have to be corrected by philosophical analysis (1965: 352
4). For him, explanations are the instruments by which understanding of the
world is achieved. So understanding the world is the intellectual benet we
can acquire by constructing explanations. What does this understanding of
the world consist in?
Thus a D-N Explanation answers the question ‘Why did the expla-
nandum-phenomenon occur?’ by showing that the phenomenon re-
sulted form certain particular circumstances, specied in C1, C2,
. . . Ck, in accordance with the laws L1, L2, . . . Lr. By pointing this
out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and
the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be
expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to
understand why the phenomenon occurred. (Hempel 1965: 337)
In other words: understanding must be identied with nomic expectability
(i.e. expectability based on laws), and this is the one and only intellectual
benet we can acquire by constructing explanations. Once we realise that
understanding equals expectability, we can get rid of our bad intuitions, and
realise that explanations are symmetric. Why is the agpole’s height 10
meters? Because the shadow is 10 meters, and, coupled with information
about light and the sun’s position, the height can be expected on the basis of
this. That’s all.
Yet most philosophers of science were not convinced by Hempel’s attempt
to juggle away the asymmetry problem. The most popular path to solve the
problem, and thus to rule out derivation F2 as non-explanatory, undoubt-
edly consists in invoking causation. This path will be discussed in the next
section.
3. Causation
After describing the agpole case, among other counterexamples to Hempel’s
model, Hausman says (what many have suggested before):
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The most plausible diagnosis of these cases of D-N arguments that
are not explanations is that the premises in these arguments fail to
focus on the causes of the phenomena described in their conclu-
sions. (1998: 157)
The solution corresponding to this diagnosis is straightforward: only deriva-
tions from causes (causal derivations) are explanatory, derivations from ef-
fects are not. The literature hosts a wide variety of criteria for distinguishing
causes and effects (in terms of causal mechanisms, counterfactual depen-
dence, probabilities, or whatnot). In the following we take up Hausman’s
criterion of independent alterability which is explicitly put forward for the
D-N model. That is, Hausman holds on to the idea that explanations are
arguments. He simply adds a criterion which ensures that the factors in the
explanans are causes of the fact to be explained. The criterion is that D-N
arguments are explanations iff:
for every pair of variables, X and Y, whose values are specied in a
derivation, if the value of X were changed by intervention, then the
value of Y would be unchanged. (1998: 167)
In general, D-N arguments that cite causes in the explanans satisfy this crite-
rion, whereas those that cite effects do not. It works as follows in the agpole
case. For X take the sun’s angle of elevation, and suppose we change it from
45◦ to, say, 20◦ (e.g. by way of mirrors). Then the sun’s angle of elevation
is independently alterable relative to the other conditions specied in the
derivation just in case it does not affect them. This holds for the agpole’s
height, but not for its shadow. If we change the sun’s angle of elevation, the
agpole’s height remains unaffected, but a change of the shadow would au-
tomatically follow. Furthermore, because derivation F1, but not F2, satises
this criterion of independent alterability, only F1 is explanatory.
Now for the motivation. How can causation as additional condition be
justied? Why would causation matter to explanation? Or again: why do
causes explain their effects, but effects not their causes? First, it can be ar-
gued that causal derivations, as opposed to non-causal derivations, provide
knowledge that is useful from a practical point of view. Here are some ex-
amples of practical functions which causal explanations can have:
- Suppose that two students, A and B, hand in a quasi-identical copy of
a written exam. There are some plausible explanations: there might
be a source C which has communicated answers to both A and B; or
A has copied B’s answers, or vice versa. Suppose it turns out that
A has copied from B, while B did not cooperate. If anyone needs to
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be punished, it must be A, not B. This shows that explaining a fact
(in case: the similarities) is sometimes motivated by the importance
the explanation has for determining our attitude towards other people
(in case: punish A, B, or both). In general causal explanation can be
important for our legal or moral judgments.
- When the space shuttle Challenger exploded on 28 January 1986, a
committee of twelve investigators tried to nd an explanation. This
search was attitude-related (NASA wanted to know who was respon-
sible), but also aimed at preventing similar accidents in the future.
- If a physician tries to explain the symptoms of his patient (by invok-
ing a disease that causes them) or a car mechanic tries to determine
why a car does not work, these explanations are motivated by the de-
sire to restore the original state of the object.
These three functions relate to explanations of particular events. If the ex-
planandum is more generic (e.g. a pattern of behaviour, or the incidence of a
disease in a society) then the practical function is also more generic: the ex-
planation provides an effective strategy to manipulate the explanandum. For
example, if part of the explanation of why lung cancer occurs, is that peo-
ple smoke, the practical use of this explanation lies in the fact at convincing
people to stop smoking is an effective strategy for reducing the incidence of
lung cancer. If an explanation request (why-question) is motivated by one
of the practical functions mentioned above (or a similar one) this entails that
the answer must be a causal explanation. This is how causation as additional
constraint can often be justied in the context of scientic explanations.
A second argument is that independent alterability, and so causation, ac-
counts for predictability (Hausman 1998: 1702). We can correctly predict
what will happen if something happens to one of the conditions in case they
are independently alterable. But this is not possible if they are not. So if
we change the angle in F1 (to 20◦, say), we can still correctly predict the
shadow’s length (for we can safely assume that the height remains the same
during our intervention):
(F1∗) L s = h/ tan(a).
C1 The height of the agpole is 10m.
C2 The angle of elevation of the sun is 20◦.
∴ E The shadow of the agpole is ±27.5m.
But if we similarly change the angle in F2, we cannot predict the agpole’s
height, for we do not know the new length of the shadow:
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(F2∗) L h = s · tan(a).
C1 The shadow of the agpole is ? meters.
C2 The angle of elevation of the sun is 20◦.
∴ E The height of the agpole is ? meters.
And if we keep the old value of the length (i.e. 10m), we would get an in-
correct result (i.e. ±3.6m), for we cannot assume that the shadow’s length
remains the same. Generally, causal explanations enable more correct pre-
dictions of future events. Note that this is also a practical reason for prefer-
ring causal explanations. In the cases we mentioned before, causation was
indispensable for practical reasons (e.g. manipulation). Here it is not in-
dispensable, but causal knowledge is better. But it is better for a practical
reason: predictions. This will be important in Sect. 7. Let us turn to the next
criterion.
4. Unification
As we have seen in Sect. 2, Hempel identies understanding with being able
to show that the explanandum event could have been expected on the basis of
certain laws and conditions. Kitcher (1981, 1989) identies scientic under-
standing with unication. Unication can be provisionally characterized as
systematic predictability: unifying our experiences amounts to showing that
the particular events and regularities we have observed, could have been pre-
dicted by using a limited number of argument patterns over and over again.
In Kitcher’s view, all explanations are deductive arguments, but not vice
versa: only arguments that unify have explanatory power.
The central concept in Kitcher’s theory of explanation and understand-
ing is argument pattern. An argument pattern is a triple of (i) a sequence
of schematic sentences, (ii) a set of sets of lling instructions, and (iii) a
classication. A schematic sentence is an expression obtained by replacing
some, but not necessarily all, of the non-logical expressions in a sentence
with dummy letters. The lling instructions are directions for replacing the
dummy letters. An argument pattern contains one set of lling instructions
for each entry of the sequence of schematic sentences. A classication de-
scribes the inferential characteristics of a sequence of schematic sentences.
An example:
Sequence of schematic sentences
(1) a is a P.
(2) All Ps are bald.
(3) a is bald.
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Filling instructions
a must be replaced with the name of an individual, P with an arbitrary
predicate.
Classification
(1) and (2) are premises, (3) follows from (1) and (2) by means of
universal instantiation and modus ponens.
An example of an argument (which, in turn, is a couple of a sequence of
sentences and a classication) tting this pattern is:
Sequence of sentences
(1) Horace is a member of the Greenburgh School Board.
(2) All members of the Greenburgh School Board are bald.
(3) Horace is bald.
Classification
(1) and (2) are premises, (3) follows from (1) and (2) by means of
universal instantiation and modus ponens.
Kitcher uses argument patterns to distinguish explanations from non-explan-
atory arguments. For an individual with knowledge K (a set of sentences), an
argument A can only be an explanation if it is acceptable relative to K (i.e. if
the premises of A are members of K). But not all acceptable arguments are
explanations: an acceptable argument is an explanation iff it instantiates an
argument pattern that belongs to a privileged set of argument patterns. This
set of argument patterns is privileged because it has a higher unifying power
with respect to K than any other conceivable set of argument patterns.
We shall not discuss which factors determine the unifying power of a set of
argument patterns in detail. All we need to know is that paucity of patterns is
one of the factors: sets that do contain superuous patterns are not optimal.
Kitcher uses this criterion to rule out the use of accidental generalisations
like ‘All members of the Greenburgh School Board are bald.’ It is possible
to derive Horace’s baldness through a derivation which contains this premise.
However, we also have to explain the baldness of people that are not member
of the Greenburgh School Board. The general biochemical argument pattern
we set for that can also be used for Horace and his fellow board members. So
the argument pattern containing the accidental generalisation is superuous,
and its instantiations are arguments but no explanations.
Kitcher deals with explanatory asymmetries in a similar way (1981: 525;
1989: 4847). The agpole’s shadow cannot be explained by the agpole’s
height because there is an alternative derivation of the agpole’s height which
instantiates an argument pattern with greater unifying power. Just consider
the fact that unlighted agpoles also have heights. If we wanted to explain
the height by the shadow, we would need a different explanation of the height
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in case it is dark. More generally, we would end up with different explana-
tions for the height of lighted and unlighted things, and this is not the case
for the derivation of the agpole’s height which invokes an origin and devel-
opment argument pattern, rather than shadows. Compare:
Suppose now that we admit as explanatory a derivation of the length
of a simple pendulum from a specication of the period. Then we
shall have to explain the lengths of non-swinging bodies by employ-
ing quite a different style of explanation (an origin and development
derivation). (Kitcher 1981: 525)
Kitcher does not specify what this origin an development pattern would con-
sist in. It has to be an argument pattern that is widely applicable (in any
case all agpoles) and yet it should not be too vague (because stringency of
argument patterns is also a criterion for unifying power). Suppose we would
explain the length of a 10 meters agpole by referring to (i) the fact that
the customer of the factory in which the agpole was produced ordered a
10 meters agpole, (ii) the fact that this factory has appropriate communi-
cation and quality control procedures which ensure that orders are executed
properly, and (iii) a law connecting these antecedent conditions to the ex-
planandum. We guess that this corresponds to what Kitcher had in mind.
5. Explanatory dependence
Another attempt to account for the asymmetry of scientic explanations
without invoking causation is Jobe (1976). Jobe, too, adheres to the idea
that explanations are arguments. In order to rule out derivation F2 as non-
explanatory, he proposes the explanatory dependence criterion. To wit:
A sentence P is explanatorily dependent on a sentence Q iff there
are D-N explanations of Q that do not involve P; but every D-N
explanation of P involves Q. The restriction we wish to impose on
D-N explanations [. . . ] can be stated as follows: An admissible ex-
planation of a sentence Q must not involve a sentence P such that P
is explanatorily dependent of Q. (1976: 544)
This works as follows in the agpole case. The shadow’s length is explana-
torily dependent on the agpole’s height, but not vice versa, for there are
explanations of the agpole’s height that do not involve the shadow (e.g. the
explanation that invokes the origin and development argument pattern from
the previous section, or some less unied explanation), but any explanation
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of the shadow’s length involves the agpole’s height. As the present criterion
goes, the shadow’s length cannot be used to explain the agpole’s height, and
F2 is ruled out.
Note that Jobe confuses variables and their specic values in the text just
cited. It is not the case that the sentence ‘the shadow is 10m’ is explanatorily
dependent on the sentence ‘the agpole is 10m’, for if the sun’s angle of el-
evation is e.g. 50◦ then the sentence ‘the shadow is 10m’ cannot be derived
from the sentence ‘the agpole is 10m’ (but it can be derived from ‘the ag-
pole is ±12m’). It is only the case that the shadow’s length is explanatorily
dependent on the agpole’s height, which are two variables.
Jobe’s basic motivation for this criterion has nothing to do with expectabil-
ity, nor with practical usefulness, nor with unication. Rather, the nice fea-
ture of his criterion is that it directly rules out circular explanations, such as
the loop between agpole’s height and its shadow (which would exist if both
F1 and F2 were admissible).
So far the three asymmetry criteria that have been set forth to account for
the asymmetry of scientic explanation.2
6. Metaphysical derivations
In the following we spell out the metaphysical claims (1)(8) from Sect. 1 in
terms of the deductive-nomological model.
Regularity 1: x has property F iff x resembles all Fs.
(1a) L Something is 10m iff it resembles all other 10m objects.
A Our agpole is 10m.
∴ B The agpole resembles all other 10m objects.
(1b) L Something is 10m iff it resembles all other 10m objects.
B Our agpole resembles all other 10m objects.
∴ A The agpole is 10m.
2 Both non-causal asymmetry criteria have their critics. See e.g. Barnes (1994) for uni-
fication, and Woodward (1984) for explanatory dependence. Since we are only surveying
the different options as to asymmetry in the literature on scientific explanation, we shall not
discuss that here.
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Regularity 2: x has property F iff x’s parts jointly have property F (usually
proper parts which adjoin, but do not overlap one another spatially).
(2a) L Something is 10m iff the sum of its parts is 10m.
A The agpole’s parts are jointly 10m.
∴ B The agpole is 10m.
From now on the obvious reverse derivations (2b)(8b) from B to A shall be
omitted.
Regularity 3: x has dispositional property F iff x has categorical property G.
(3a) L Something is disposed to be visible from a great distance iff it has
a great height.
A Our agpole has a great height.
∴ B The agpole is disposed to be visible from a great distance.
Regularity 4: x has evaluative property F iff x has non-evaluative property G.
(4a) L Something is beautiful iff it has a symmetrically shaped shadow.
A Our agpole has a symmetrically shaped shadow.
∴ B The agpole is beautiful.
Regularity 5: the proposition that X is true iff the fact that X exists.
(5a) L The proposition that the agpole is 10m is true iff the fact that the
agpole is 10m exists.
A The fact that the agpole is 10m exists.
∴ B The proposition that the agpole is 10m is true.
Regularity 6: classes exist iff their members exist.
(6a) L {agpole} exists iff the agpole exists.
A The agpole exists.
∴ B {agpole} exists.
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Regularity 7: x has mental property F iff x has neurophysiological property
G.
(7a) L People think about agpoles iff brain parts such and such are ac-
tive.
A Our brain parts such and such are active.
∴ B We think about agpoles.
Regularity 8: x has Cambridge property F iff y, wholly distinct from x, has
property G.
(8a) L The agpole has the property ‘being such that all of us think of it’
iff all of us think of it.
A Someone stops thinking about the agpole.
∴ B The agpole loses the property ‘being such that all of us think of
it’.
In each case, L describes an universal law (which is an instance of the more
general regularity), C describes a particular condition, and E follows deduc-
tively from L and C, but not from C alone. It should be stressed that the
laws are not supposed to be denitions or conceptual explanations. As many
debates in metaphysics have it, the laws are to state a regularity between two
sorts of facts in the world (mental and neurophysiological facts, dispositional
and categorical facts, etc.).
Surely all examples are controversial (e.g. do we really want to explain all
evaluative facts by non-evaluative facts?), and some of the regularities may
have counterexamples (this is why we do not use the stronger notions of
necessary coexistence or necessary covariation). For instance, what if some
of the laws turn out to be conditionals such as ‘x is disposed to be visible
from a great distance if x has a great height’ and ‘x is disposed to be visible
from a great distance if x has a weird colour’? In that case, the derivation
of the categorical fact from the dispositional fact seems impossible. But
this is only supercially so, for the conditionals can without much difculty
be turned into biconditionals. For these cases we would have the law ‘x is
disposed to be visible from a great distance iff x has a great height or a weird
colour’, and from the dispositional fact plus the absence of either categorical
fact, we can derive the other categorical fact.
For our purposes we just assume all premises hold, so that we have sixteen
D-N explanations, and sixteen times the conclusion of the derivation can be
expected on the basis of the laws and conditions in question.
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However, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata;
if facts about wholes can be explained by facts about their parts; if dispo-
sitional facts can be explained by categorical facts; if evaluative facts can
be explained by non-evaluative facts; if the truth of propositions can be ex-
plained by their truthmakers; if facts about classes can be explained by facts
about their members; if mental facts can be explained by neurophysiologi-
cal facts; and if Cambridge facts can be explained by non-Cambridge facts;
but not vice versa, then in all cases (a), not (b), is an explanation. So what
entitles us to believe this?
7. Application
In this section we investigate whether the three asymmetry criteria of causa-
tion, unication and explanatory dependence from Sect. 35 are applicable
in the eight cases just spelled out. To recap:3
CAUSATION. X can be explained by Y iff Y is a cause of X, i.e. values
of both Y and a third variable Z are specied in the D-N derivation
of X, and Z is independently alterable relative to Y.
UNIFICATION. X can be explained by Y iff there is no alternative D-N
derivation of X which instantiates an argument pattern with greater
unifying power.
EXPLANATORY DEPENDENCE. X can be explained by Y iff Y is not ex-
planatorily dependent upon X, i.e. there are D-N explanations of Y
that do not involve X, but every D-N explanation of X involves Y.
Here is an argument against the usefulness of the former two criteria for
metaphysical explanation. Observe that in each case A and B are intimately
connected. Consider for example the derivations (3a) and (3b) with the facts
that the agpole is disposed to be visible from a great distance and that the
agpole has a great height. By the law ‘something is disposed to be visible
from a great distance iff it has a great height’, either fact gives us the other,
and no further conditions are needed. Or take (1a) and (1b) with the facts
that the agpole is 10m and that it resembles all other 10m objects. By the
law ‘something is 10m iff it resembles all other 10m objects’, either fact
gives us the other, and no further conditions are needed. It can be shown
3 Again: X and Y are placeholders for variables, not for the values they take.
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that this intimate connection between A and B forms a problem for both the
causation criterion and the unication criterion.
Causation is simple. Since the derivations have just one condition, they
cannot be independently alterable with respect to one another, and hence
there is no causation.
Also, in the literature it is maintained that the connection between A and
B is non-causal anyway (Kim 1974, 1994; cf. Ruben 1990: ch. 7; Liggins
2009). Resemblance facts would non-causally depend upon facts about their
relata; facts about wholes would non-causally depend upon facts about their
parts; etc. Kim (1974: 423) sets forth two arguments for this: an argument
from time, and one from modality.
The argument from time is that the facts described by the explanans and
explanandum in the metaphysical cases exist simultaneously, where this is
not (or need not be) the case for scientic explanations. There is for instance
no temporal difference between the fact that our agpole is 10m and the
fact that it resembles all other 10m objects, whereas such a difference does
obtain between the agpole’s height and the shadow: the temporal part of
the agpole which is responsible for the blocking of the sunlight precedes
the shadow (however small the interval).
The argument from modality is that causal laws are supposedly contingent,
i.e. they may fail to obtain, and this does not seem to hold for the metaphysi-
cal regularities. As Kim says about the Cambridge case: the relation strikes
us as more intimate than one that is mediated by contingent causal laws.
(1974: 43) So it may be a contingent fact that light travels in straight lines,
and hence that there is a connection between lengths of agpoles and their
shadows, but this is not so for the connection between resemblance facts
and facts about their relata, between facts about wholes and facts about their
parts, etc.
There is a further problem about the causation criterion. Metaphysics,
unlike a lot of scientic research, is not supposed to be practically useful. As
far as we can see, explanation requests in metaphysics are never motivated by
practical concerns such as the ones we mentioned in Sect. 3. This means that
even if the metaphysical cases are causal (which is not the case, given that
the arguments above are correct), the reason of why the causation criterion
should be accepted as a constraint on metaphysical explanations does not
work.
Now the problem for unication. Since there are in the metaphysical cases
no further conditions needed to get B from A, or A from B (like the sun
which, as third factor, was responsible for the difference between lighted and
unlighted things), nothing makes a difference as to the unifying power of the
argument patterns instantiated by the reverse derivations. In sum, neither the
criterion of causation nor unication rules out the (b)-explanations (nor the
(a)-explanations for that matter).
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Since A and B are intimately bound up with one another in the metaphysi-
cal cases, it is sometimes even suggested that the facts described by them are
identical (cf. the discussion in Ruben 1990: 21822). This would imply that
there is no difference between resemblance facts and the corresponding facts
about their relata; between facts about wholes and facts about their parts; be-
tween dispositional facts and facts about their categorical bases; between
truthbearers and their truthmakers; etc. Although this issue has important
implications (would it really make sense to ask why the explanation of A by
B is irreversible if A and B describe just the same thing?), it is a tricky one,
and we do not want to go into it here.
If causation and unication are out, we are left with Jobe’s explanatory
dependence criterion. On rst sight it seems to work. Take again the rst
metaphysical case. Resemblance facts are explanatorily dependent on facts
about their relata because there are D-N explanations of the latter facts that
do not involve the former, but any D-N explanation of the former involves the
latter. Interestingly, and again because of their intimate connection, the same
seems to hold for the values they take. The fact that our agpole resembles
all other 10m objects is explanatorily dependent on the fact that our agpole
is 10m for there are D-N explanations of the latter that do not involve the
former, and any D-N explanation of the former involves the latter.
Is this right? Those familiar with the Resemblance Regress may think of
the following counterexample:
(2c) x resembles all other 10m objects iff all pairs {x, 10m object y1},
. . . , {x, 10m object yn} resemble all other resembling pairs.
{our agpole, 10m object y1}, . . . , {our agpole, 10m object yn}
resemble all other resembling pairs.
∴ Our agpole resembles all other 10m objects.
This is a D-N explanation of the fact that our agpole resembles all other
10m objects which does not invoke the fact that the agpole is 10m, and so
if the counterexample holds, the criterion of explanatory dependence fails
to establish asymmetry in the initial case, i.e. to rule out (2b) as non-
explanatory.
However, there are some worries about the counterexample. First, it can
be objected that (2c) gets the explanation in the wrong direction. The fact
that our agpole resembles all other 10m objects can explain the fact that
{agpole, 10m object y1}, . . . , {agpole, 10m object yn} resemble all other
resembling pairs, but not the other way around. This objection may be right,
but the problem with it is that it already assumes the asymmetry of explana-
tion. If we wanted to establish asymmetry in this new case, and we would
use the same criterion of explanatory dependence, we are off on a regress (it
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is easier to check the regress in terms of the example with classes, see the
Appendix for details).
There is nonetheless a second problem with (2c): it, again, invokes a non-
causal regularity as law. How about taking that into account? A proposal:
EXPLANATORY DEPENDENCE∗. X can be explained by Y iff both of the
following:
(i) there are D-N explanations of Y that do not involve X and are
causal;
(ii) every D-N explanation of X involves Y or is not causal.
By a non-causal explanation we basically mean that the independent alter-
ability criterion cannot be applied (and also that there is too much necessity
in the law it invokes, but see the discussion above).
On the basis of this modied criterion many asymmetries can be estab-
lished. Let us spell out two examples in some detail. The rst: the fact that
the singleton {agpole} exists can be explained by the fact that the agpole
exists, but not vice versa. According to our criterion, the existence of {ag-
pole} can be explained by the existence of the agpole only if the follow-
ing conditions hold: (i) there is a causal D-N explanation of the existence
of the agpole that does not involve {agpole}; and (ii) all D-N explana-
tions of the existence of {agpole} that do not involve the existence of the
agpole are non-causal. Condition (i) is satised because there is an origin-
and-development explanation of the existence of the agpole (cf. Sect. 4).
Condition (ii) is satised because all explanations of the existence of {ag-
pole} that do not appeal to the agpole involve non-causal laws (e.g. {x}
exists iff {{x}} does, cf. the Appendix). Now consider the second half of
the asymmetry. We want the claim that the existence of the agpole can be
explained by the existence of {agpole} to come out as false if we apply
our criterion. This means that either of the following claims must be re-
jected: (i) there is a causal D-N explanation of the existence {agpole} that
does not involve the existence of the agpole; (ii) all D-N explanations of the
existence the agpole that do not involve the existence of {agpole} are non-
causal. Both conditions can be rejected: (i) fails because there are no causal
explanations of sets, such as the singleton {agpole}, and (ii) fails because
the origin-and-development explanation of the existence of the agpole is
causal.
The second example: the fact that the agpole resembles all other 10m
objects can be explained by the fact that it is 10m, but not vice versa. Ac-
cording to our criterion, the resemblance fact can be explained by the length
of the agpole only if the following conditions hold: (i) there is a causal
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D-N explanation of the length of the agpole that does not involve the re-
semblance fact; and (ii) all D-N explanations of the resemblance fact that do
not involve the length of the agpole are non-causal. Condition (i) is satised
because there is an origin-and-development explanation of the length of the
agpole (see Sect. 4). Condition (ii) is satised because all explanations of
the resemblance fact that do not appeal to the length of the agpole involve
non-causal laws (e.g. x resembles all other 10m objects iff all pairs {x, 10m
object y1}, . . . , {x, 10m object yn} resemble all other resembling pairs, see
above). Now consider the second half of the asymmetry. We want the claim
that the length of the agpole can be explained by the resemblance fact to
come out as false if we apply our criterion. This means that either of the fol-
lowing claims must be rejected: (i) there is a causal D-N explanation of the
resemblance fact that does not involve the length of the agpole; (ii) all D-N
explanations of the length of the agpole that do not involve the resemblance
fact are non-causal. Both conditions can be rejected: (i) fails because there
are presumably no causal explanations of resemblance facts, such as the fact
that the agpole resembles all other 10m objects, and (ii) fails because the
origin-and-development explanation of the length of the agpole is causal.
One might think that the modication of the criterion is ad hoc and lacks
proper motivation. It can nonetheless be shown that the modication is
needed for independent reasons. Consider this non-causal explanation of
the shadow’s length:
Something is 10m iff the sum of its parts is 10m.
The agpole shadow’s parts are jointly 10m.
∴ The agpole’s shadow is 10m.
If this is a good D-N explanation, then we have an explanation of the shad-
ow’s length which does not involve the shadow’s height after all. As a conse-
quence, the original explanatory dependence criterion would fail to establish
asymmetry in the ordinary agpole case from Sect. 2. Not so for the modi-
ed criterion.
Yet the modied criterion does not work in all cases. The explanatory
asymmetry, if any, between facts about wholes and facts about their parts is
one (for in that case there are presumably alternative causal explanations of
either, so that the explanation would run in both directions). The putative
explanatory asymmetry between facts about classes and facts about their
members where the latter themselves are classes (e.g. between {agpole}
and {{agpole}}) is another (for in that case there are no alternative causal
explanations at all, so that the explanation would run in no direction). How-
ever, we are not trying to defend the criterion in all generality. The aim of
this paper is more limited: we wanted to know whether there is any criterion
05wieland_weber
2010/9/18
page 363
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATORY ASYMMETRIES 363
(or set of them) available in the literature on scientic explanation which can
establish the asymmetry of metaphysical explanation. Let us conclude our
investigation.
8. Conclusion
In the introduction we asked:
- Is there a good reason for regarding metaphysical explanations as
asymmetric, or is this just a widespread prejudice?
- If there is asymmetry, what is its nature?
The paper’s aim was to check the three asymmetry criteria from the litera-
ture on scientic explanation. As it turned out, causation cannot establish
the asymmetry of metaphysical explanation. Neither can unication. But
a modied version of the explanatory dependence criterion do the job for a
large group of cases. There is no doubt a moral to all this. That we should be
cautious in assuming the asymmetry of explanation in specic cases. And
there is also an open question. It has been suggested to us that the explana-
tory dependence criterion appears to be a surface criterion, one which may
work only because of a deeper story about explanatory asymmetries. That is
work for a different paper.
Appendix
Claim: the explanatory dependence criterion can establish the explanatory
asymmetry between the fact that a exists and the fact that {a} does if all
D-N explanations of the latter invoke the former.
Counterexample1: by the law that x exists iff {x} does, {a} exists because
{{a}} does.
Objection to counterexample1: {{a}} exists because {a} does, not vice
versa.
Objection to the objection: the foregoing objection already assumes the
asymmetry of explanation.
Solution: the explanatory dependence criterion can establish the explanatory
asymmetry between the fact that {a} exists and the fact that {{a}} does,
namely if all D-N explanations of the latter invoke the former.
Counterexample2: by the law that x exists iff {x} does, {{a}} exists because
{{{a}}} does.
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Objection to counterexample2: {{{a}}} exists because {{a}} exists, not vice
versa.
There is again an objection to the objection to counterexample2, plus a so-
lution, plus a counterexample3 to the solution, plus an objection to counter-
example3, etc.
Conclusion: as the objection to counterexample1 gives rise to a similar coun-
terexample, it is not a good objection. It follows that counterexample1 is not
refuted by it.
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